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Abstract
India has an elaborate system of capital controls which impede cap-
ital mobility and particularly short-term debt. Yet, when the global
money market fell into turmoil after the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers on 13/14 September 2008, the Indian money market immediately
experienced considerable stress, and the operating procedures of mon-
etary policy broke down. We suggest that Indian multinationals were
using the global money market and were short of dollars on 15 Septem-
ber. They borrowed in India and took capital out of the country. We
make three predictions that follow from this hypothesis, and nd that
the evidence matches these predictions. This suggests an important
role for Indian multinationals in India's evolution towards de facto
convertibility.
Keywords: capital controls, global nancial crisis, Indian multina-
tionals, eectiveness of capital controls, de facto convertibility.
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21 Introduction
De jure measures of capital account liberalisation suggest that India's capital
account is quite closed. De facto integration has risen sharply in recent years,
but India still remains fairly closed. The rapid transmission of the impact
of the Lehman bankruptcy into Indian nancial markets was consequently
unexpected. In this paper, we propose an explanation involving the treasury
operations of Indian multinationals (MNCs). These MNCs are less subject
to the capital controls imposed on Indian companies.
The developments in Indian nancial markets in September and October fol-
lowing the death of Lehman Brothers in New York on September 14, 2008
were quite unprecedented. First, there was the sudden change in conditions
in the money market. Call money rates shot up immediately after September
15th. Despite swift action by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the tightness
persisted through the month of October. The operating procedure of mon-
etary policy broke down in unprecedented fashion. Rates were persistently
above RBI's policy rate corridor. The call rate consistently breached the
ceiling of the repo rate, of 9 percent, and attained values beyond 15 percent.
There was a huge amount of borrowing from RBI. On some days, RBI lent
an unprecedented Rs.90,000 crore through repos.
These events are surprising given the apparent scale of India's de jure capital
controls. Our understanding of crisis transmission, the eectiveness of cap-
ital controls, and India's de facto openness would be enhanced by carefully
investigating this episode and identifying explanations.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that many Indian rms (nancial and
non-nancial) had been using the global money market before the crisis,
avoiding India's capital controls by locating global money market operations
in oshore subsidiaries. When the global money market collapsed after the
failure of Lehman, these rms were suddenly short of dollar liquidity. They
borrowed in the rupee money market, converted rupees to USD, to meet
obligations abroad.
This led to pressure on the currency market. The rupee depreciated sharply.
RBI attempted to reduce rupee depreciation by selling dollars. It sold $18.6
billion in the foreign exchange market in October alone. Ordinarily, we may
have expected depreciation of the exchange rate on both the spot and the
forward markets. However, instead of the forward premium going up when
there was pressure on the rupee to depreciate, or remaining the same, it
crashed sharply. Our hypothesis is that some Indian MNCs, who were taking
3dollars out of India, planned to bring the money back to India in a few weeks.
To lock in the price at which they would bring money back after a month,
they sold dollars forward. The one month forward premium fell sharply into
negative territory.
Balance of payments data shows outbound FDI was the largest element of
outows in the `sudden stop' of capital ows to India of the last quarter of
2008. This supports this hypothesis. This was not a time when there was
signicant merger and acquisitions activity going on owing to the banking
and money market crisis around the world. The explanation for the large
FDI outow when money market conditions in India and the world were
among the worst in many decades could lie in the oshore money market
operations of Indian MNCs.
Finally, we analyse stock market data, and nd that Indian MNCs were more
exposed to conditions in international money markets as compared with non-
MNCs.
The contribution of this paper lies in showing that Indian MNCs are now
an important channel through which India is nancially integrated into the
world economy. This raises questions about the eectiveness of India's cap-
ital controls which inhibit short-dated borrowing by rms. This restriction
appears to be sidestepped to a substantial extent by Indian MNCs. This evi-
dence ts into the larger understanding about the gap between India's highly
restrictive de jure capital controls but yet substantial de facto openness.
2 What happened in India when Lehman broke
2.1 India's capital account liberalisation
The extent of capital account integration is usefully examined in terms of
the apparent rules in place (de jure integration) as opposed to the eective
ground reality (de facto integration).
One important database with cross-country evidence about de jure capital
controls has been created by Chinn and Ito (2008). Figure 1 shows the time-
series of the Chinn-Ito measure from 1970 till 2007 for India, for the world
average and the emerging markets average. The Indian value of the score
has been at -1.1 all through, which highlights the limited progress that India
has made in terms of removing capital controls. The world mean went up
from -0.38 in 1970 to 0.495 in 2007. The average for emerging markets went
4Figure 1 De Jure capital controls

































Source: Chinn and Ito (2008)
up from -0.375 in 1970 to 0.59 in 2007. Thus, regardless of whether India is
compared against the world average or emerging markets, in both 1970 and
2007, its capital account has been signicantly more closed, de jure.1
In terms of de facto measures, there are two important approaches to mea-
surement. The rst involves a simple examination of the gross ows on the
balance of payments, expressed as percent of GDP. This extends the intuition
of the trade/GDP ratio. Figure 2 shows that gross ows have risen dramati-
cally in recent decades, growing from roughly 20 per cent to roughly 125 per
cent. Of particular interest is the doubling which took place in the period
after 2002, which suggests an accelerated pace of capital account integration
in these years.
The second strategy for measuring de facto integration lies in arriving at
estimates of the stock of external assets and liabilities, as has been done by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Their database shows that India has been
rapidly opening up. At the same time, as Prasad (2009) notes, on a cross-
country comparison and relative to its size, India appears to have been one
1The measurement of intensity of capital controls is itself a eld where standard
methodologies have not yet been fully established. Another measurement eort, Edwards
(2007), nds that Indian de jure capital controls have eased signicantly in the recent
decade.
5Figure 2 Gross ows to GDP









































Source: Business Beacon, CMIE
of the least nancially open economies in the world.
2.2 The events of September 2008
When the global nancial crisis erupted, at rst it was believed that India
would be experience little turbulence, given a relatively closed economy and
domestic nancial system. The events went against these expectations (Aziz
et al., 2008). Table 1 juxtaposes three time-series, observed at a daily fre-
quency. The `TED Spread' measures nancial distress in London.2 This is
compared against two measures of money market tightness in India: the call
money interest rate and the quantity borrowed from RBI by the banking
system.
The last pre-crisis day was 12 September 2008, which was a Friday. On
this day, the call money rate was 6.15 per cent and the banking system
had borrowed Rs.144 billion from RBI. Over the weekend, Lehman Brothers
led for bankruptcy. On Monday, the money market in Bombay opened
in turmoil, even though this opens 5.5 hours before the money market in
2This is the spread between the three-month USD LIBOR and the 90 day US treasury
bill (UST). This measures the extent to which nancial rms mistrust each other. Under
normal circumstances, this is near zero.
6Table 1 Turmoil in the money market: from London to India
Date TED Spread Call money rate RBI repo
(Bln. Rs.)
(Monday) 8 Sep 1.13 8.83 10.25
9 Sep 1.19 8.30 30.25
10 Sep 1.20 8.94 129.85
11 Sep 1.24 8.88 151.95
12 Sep 1.36 6.15 144.00
(Monday) 15 Sep 1.79 9.84 518.15
16 Sep 2.04 10.59 575.65
17 Sep 3.03 13.07 594.80
Source: Author's calculations based on data in Datastream, Business Beacon, CMIE
London. By 17 September (Wednesday), the quantity borrowed by banks
from RBI had jumped to Rs.594 billion. The call money rate had risen to
13.07 per cent.
Some of the Indian money market tightening was caused by the advance tax
payment of 15 September and the unfortunate timing of a government bond
auction. However, tightness in liquidity owing to such events typically sub-
sides rapidly. In this episode, money market tightness did not subside rapidly.
On 7 October, the call rate closed at over 16 percent. In a similar vein, the
RBI repo operations surged from Rs.100 billion on 8 September to Rs.575.65
billion on 16 September and then to Rs.900 billion on 29 September.
Figure 3 shows the status of RBI's `liquidity adjustment facility' (LAF) op-
erations. The numerical values seen here are an inadequate depiction of the
liquidity squeeze, since access to borrowing from RBI is restricted to a few
nancial rms and requires certain kinds of collateral. A lot more borrowing
would have taken place if the rules would have permitted it. A better picture
of liquidity conditions is obtained from observing interest rates.
Figure 4 shows the time-series of the call money rate juxtaposed against the
\corridor" dened by RBI's repo and reverse repo rates. For a while, the call
money rate was closer to the top of the corridor. In the weeks following the
Lehman bankruptcy, the call money rate consistently breached the ceiling
of 9 per cent, often attaining values of above 15 per cent. The operating
procedure of monetary policy broke down in unprecedented fashion.
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92.3 The question
Indian capital controls are a maze of rules, restrictions, quantitative con-
trols and outright bans. For instance, restrictions on external commercial
borrowing prevent rms from borrowing short term (less than 3 years) in
international money markets or to utilise the money borrowed for uses other
than those specied such as capital goods imports and infrastructure. The
total borrowing by India has a cap and every rm needs approval from RBI
for such borrowing. India is one of the more closed economies in the world
in terms of de jure controls. On the weekend of 13/14 September 2008, there
was a near-universal consensus in India that the turmoil in global markets
caused by the failure of Lehman Brothers was not going to aect India. Yet,
in the week starting 15 September, the Indian money market fell into turmoil.
These events merit an exploration.
These events clearly suggest a gap between de jure controls and the extent
to which they bind. The international evidence suggests that over time, and
particularly when given a sophisticated nancial system, capital controls lose
eectiveness as economic agents learn ways to get around these controls.
This motivates the question: What were the aspects of the capital account
which enabled substantial de facto integration despite the burden of de jure
controls? In this paper, we argue that the new phenomenon of Indian MNCs
is important to understanding these events.
3 A proposed explanation: oshore opera-
tions of Indian MNCs
Our main argument involves the global treasuries of Indian MNCs.
The domestic operations of all Indian rms { MNCs and others { are subject
to the same regime of capital controls concerning oshore borrowing. It
is reasonable to expect MNCs to be no more eective at obtaining foreign
borrowing, when compared with non-MNCs. However, MNCs are able to
borrow in their overseas subsidiaries in a way that domestic rms cannot. In
an environment where RBI enforced quantitative restrictions upon overseas
access to debt capital for rms operating in India, it is reasonable to think
that MNCs would have done borrowing in their oshore subsidiaries.
When the global money market became illiquid on 13/14 September, these
rms were faced with dollar shortages associated with liabilities which could
10not be rolled over. It would be ecient for these rms to respond to this
situation by borrowing in rupees in India, moving this money abroad, and
thus discharging their dollar liabilities.
If this explanation is on track, then it has signicant implications for the
extent to which India will be able to maintain meaningful capital controls in
the face of the rise of Indian MNCs. It is hence interesting to investigate this
hypothesis further.
Information from within Indian MNCs which would directly resolve this ques-
tion is not available. Hence, in this paper, we focus on three predictions that
follow from this proposed explanation:
Prediction about the currency market Some of the MNCs taking capital out
of the country in the week of 15 September would be anticipating the return
of this money into India in the future. They could choose to hedge their
currency risk by locking in the INR/USD exchange rate at which the capital
would come back at a future date. The Indian currency derivatives market is
fairly illiquid and inecient; shocks to the order ow inuence prices. Hence,
if signicant capital left the country in meeting short-term money market
obligations, and if many rms chose to hedge the return of this capital into
India at a future date, then an unusual decline in the INR/USD forward
premium would be observed.
Prediction about quarterly BOP data Late 2008 was a dicult period in the
Indian economy and the world economy. Ordinarily, outward FDI ows
would be muted in this period. However, if Indian MNCs wanted to take
money out of the country in order to meet obligations on the money market
abroad, one path which they could use is RBI rules about outbound FDI.
Hence, we would expect to see an unusual upsurge in outbound FDI in that
quarter.
Prediction about stock market price uctuations Oshore borrowing by In-
dian rms is constrained by capital controls. If Indian MNCs were evading
these controls by borrowing through oshore subsidiaries, then their stock
prices should be signicantly exposed to uctuations of the oshore credit
spread relevant for emerging market corporations.
3.1 The rise of Indian MNCs
In recent years, there has been an upsurge of outward FDI from India (Prad-
han, 2004; Demirbas et al., 2009). Hundreds of large Indian rms are now
11Table 2 Exporters and MNCs in the CMIE Cospi rms
Not MNC MNC Sum
Not Exporter 827 44 871
Exporter 1003 288 1291
Sum 1830 332 2162
Source: Author's calculations based on data in Prowess, CMIE
MNCs, and the most outwardly oriented of these increasingly have over 50
per cent of their assets outside the country.
The literature on capital account openess or cross-border ows has focussed
on portfolio, debt or FDI ows rather than on the internal ows and treasury
operations of MNCs. However, there is a literature on how MNCs organise
themselves, which suggests that MNCs make decisions about utilising nan-
cial markets in dierent countries based on costs of nancing. As an example,
Desai et al. (2004) examine the ways in which rms use internal capital mar-
kets opportunistically to complement external nancing opportunities when
external nance is costly and when there are tax arbitrage opportunities.
In a world where MNCs run global treasuries, maximise the tax eciency
of their operations, and source capital at the cheapest price across multiple
locations, it is reasonable to think that MNCs would also optimally exploit
opportunities for engaging in cross-border nance, based on a sophisticated
understanding of a given set of capital controls.
Another dimension is the explicit evasion of capital controls. MNCs engage
in substantial intra-rm trade. These transactions can be used for transfer
pricing, so as to recognise prots at low-tax locations, and to move capital
across the world in ways that are not permitted by capital controls. There
is thus a link between the rise of MNCs and the long-understood issues of
misinvoicing as a mechanism for obtaining de facto capital account openness
(Patnaik and Vasudevan, 2000; Patnaik et al., 2009).
3.2 Data description
We draw rm level data from the CMIE Prowess data base, using data for
rms in the CMIE COSPI index, which is a set of 2500 companies with
high stock market liquidity and good disclosure. This includes both nancial
and non-nancial rms. Of these, the 2162 companies which had full data
availability for 2007-08 were included in the data set for our analysis.
A rm is dened as a multinational if it holds more than 1 per cent of total
12Table 3 Summary statistics about four kinds of rms
Variable Units D DI DX DXI All
Age Years 21.00 19.50 23.00 21.00 22.00
iqr 15.00 45.50 21.00 13.00 18.00
Total assets Rs. crore 131.48 577.78 226.82 615.20 214.07
iqr 490.51 1765.42 501.70 1678.96 631.35
Sales Rs. crore 92.25 257.94 202.76 352.59 174.55
iqr 354.88 1517.58 472.51 1075.80 523.26
Employees Number 131.16 509.72 382.71 912.50 296.00
iqr 516.69 3384.52 1058.28 2318.45 1060.00
Mkt. Capn. Rs. crore 68.18 686.83 98.93 551.80 111.79
iqr 368.27 3889.40 387.28 2128.44 591.54
Turnover ratio Per cent 80.80 97.88 77.27 92.77 80.51
iqr 139.07 127.05 111.26 151.65 126.31
Exports/Sales Per cent 0.00 0.00 15.18 40.17 3.53
iqr 0.00 0.15 33.36 69.88 25.18
OFDI/Assets Per cent 0.00 3.19 0.00 8.34 0.00
iqr 0.00 7.00 0.00 17.26 0.01
Size Log Rs. crore 4.80 5.95 5.41 6.22 5.34
iqr 2.67 2.65 1.88 2.31 2.30
Leverage Times 2.10 2.20 2.48 1.91 2.26
iqr 1.99 2.48 1.71 1.32 1.78
Number of observations Number 827.00 44.00 1003.00 288.00 2162.00
Source: Author's calculations based on Prowess, CMIE
assets outside India. This emphasises the abrupt transition which takes place
when a rm becomes an MNC. When a rm is not an MNC, it is fully subject
to RBI's capital controls. Once a rm establishes overseas operations, a new
set of techniques for doing corporate nance become available. This tran-
sition is about becoming an MNC, and not about the magnitude of foreign
assets.
Symmetrically, we also dene a rm as an exporting rm if it derives more
than 1 per cent of sales from exports. Table 2 shows the breakdown of rms
based on their exporting status and their MNC status. Of the 2,162 rms
in the database, there are 332 MNCs, of which 288 are exporters and 44 are
not.
We use the terminology `D' for rms which only produce for domestic cus-
tomers, `DX' for rms that export, `DXI' for rms that export and have FDI
outside India, and `DI' for rms which are multinationals but do not export.
Table 3 shows summary statistics about the four groups for the accounting
year 2007-08. For each group of rms, for each variable of interest, the me-
dian and the inter-quartile range (IQR) is shown. Here, we dene `size' as
log((sales + assets)=2).
13Table 4 Industry distribution of the multinationals

















Source: Author's calculations based on data in Prowess, CMIE
This table shows sharp dierences between the rm characteristics of these
four groups. In particular, multinationals who are also exporters (the DXI
group) have a median value for total assets and number of employees which
is almost three times larger than that computed for the full dataset. They
have a median value for market capitalisation that is more than four times
bigger than that seen for the full dataset. They are also much more export
oriented { with an export/sales ratio of 40.17% { when compared even with
exporting rms which are not multinationals who have an export/sales ratio
of just 15.18%. In terms of nancing, multinationals have somewhat less
leverage when compared with others.
Table 4 shows the industry distribution of the MNCs. The biggest single
industry is information technology. At the same time, some multinationals
are found in all the top-level industries. While nancial rms are represented
in this data, only 14 of the 332 multinationals are nancial rms.
In this paper, we suggest that the microeconomic phenomenon of some rms
becoming multinationals helps us understand a macroeconomic phenomenon
- the crisis on the money market and the collapse of the operating procedures
of monetary policy in India after Lehman Brothers failed. For this claim to be
tenable, the size of multinationals (in the aggregate) has to be large enough
to matter to macroeconomics.
In order to assess these issues, Table 5 sums up nancial data for the 332
14Table 5 How big are the multinationals?
Variable Units Not MNC MNC All Share of MNCs
(Per cent)
Sales Rs. crore 21,12,181 5,86,082 26,98,263 21.72
Total assets Rs. crore 49,48,705 17,60,003 67,08,709 26.23
Mkt. Capn. Rs. crore 34,08,303 15,17,651 49,25,955 30.81
Exports Rs. crore 2,64,906 1,59,761 4,24,668 37.62
Number of observations Number 1830 332 2162 15.36
Source: Author's calculations based on data in Prowess, CMIE
multinationals in our dataset, and compares them against the total for the
full dataset of 2,162 rms. While the MNCs only account for 15.36% of the
rms by number, they make up between 22% and 38% of the dataset when
viewed through certain variables of interest. The sales of these 332 MNCs
works out to 11.7% of GDP, and their total assets works out to 35.2% of
GDP.
If, hypothetically, these 332 MNCs were nancing 5% of their balance sheet
through the money market in London, this translates to a sum of Rs.88,000
crore, which is of the same order of magnitude as the sudden increase in
borrowing from RBI's lending window depicted in Figure 3.
This suggests that this set of 332 multinationals is large enough to matter
to macroeconomics. To the extent that our dataset is incomplete, i.e. to
the extent that some MNCs exist which are not captured in our dataset, the
inuence of MNCs upon macroeconomic outcomes would be correspondingly
larger.
3.3 Evidence from the foreign exchange market
A sudden stop of capital ows or an outow from the capital account would
put downward pressure on the exchange rate. Evidence of this is seen in
partly in the depreciation of the rupee, and partly in the sudden and large
sale of dollars by RBI. The normal reaction to a sudden jump in the exchange
market pressure on the rupee would have been a rise in the forward premium
as people would expect further depreciation. Even if the premium did not
rise, it would remain the same. In fact, the reverse happened.
Under ordinary circumstances, currency forward pricing is done through cov-
ered interest parity (CIP). As a consequence, in most situations, the forward
price is uninformative since it merely reects CIP arbitrage. India is a rare
situation in that CIP arbitrage is blocked by RBI (Shah and Patnaik, 2007).
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As a consequence, the price of the forward is disconnected from the spot
exchange rate. As a consequence, uctuations of the order ow inuence the
forward price. This makes the forward price uniquely informative.
If MNCs were taking money out of the country in order to address a short-
term exigency, they are likely to want to bring this money back at a future
date. Some of them could choose to hedge this conversion of dollars to rupees
at a future date by selling dollars forward. In particular, the rules for banks
require that these short-term movements of capital be fully hedged.
Hence, the period where capital was leaving the country in response to the
money market crisis worldwide would be a period where dollars were being
sold forward. As a consequence, the forward premium would drop.
Figure 5 shows the time-series of the one-month rupee-dollar forward pre-
mium. The selling pressure on the forward market in the days after 15
September yielded an unprecedented crash in the forward premium. When
the forward premium is negative, it means that a dollar at a future date is
traded at a lower price than the spot price, which is an unusual conguration.
In the period from 29 September to 8 October, negative forward premia
were repeatedly seen on the one month, three month and six month forward
markets. The most extreme value seen was a premium of -4.5 per cent for the
16Table 6 What happened in the sudden stop?
(Million USD per quarter)
Sep 2007 Dec 2007 Mar 2008 Jun 2008 Sep 2008 Dec 2008
Loans 9,305 10,942 12,527 4,228 3,561 1,733
Banking capital 6,643 207 5,826 2,696 2,131 -4,956
Investment 13,027 16,892 4,760 4,778 4,254 -5,000
FDI in India 4,709 7,873 14,197 11,891 8,782 6,684
FDI by India -2,581 -5,832 -5,701 -2,902 -3,218 -5,864
Portfolio investment 10,917 14,751 -3,764 -4,178 -1,301 -5,787
Others 4,180 2,976 2,916 -579 -2,094 4,540
Net capital inows 33,155 31,017 26,029 11,123 7,852 -3,683
Source: Business Beacon, CMIE
one-month forward premium on 7 October. These events are consistent with
our arguments about the global treasuries of Indian MNCs as the mechanism
through which money market diculties in London were transferred to India.
If the problem on the domestic money market was merely one of a withdrawl
of foreign capital, these dramatic changes in forward premia would not have
taken place.
3.4 Evidence from the balance of payments
The balance of payment data, shown in Table 6, also provides important
insights into what was happening in this period.3 In this period, India ex-
perienced a sudden stop in capital inows, with net capital ows going from
an inow of $33.155 billion in the Jul/Aug/Sep 2007 quarter to an outow
of $3.7 billion in the Oct/Nov/Dec 2008 quarter.
A striking fact in the balance of payment data for October-December 2008 is
not that foreign capital owed out, as it did from many emerging economies.
The dominant story of the outow in this quarter is capital being taken
out by Indian companies. Capital leaving India through banks (`banking
capital') and through non-bank corporations (`FDI by India') added up to
$10.8 billion which was bigger than the overall net capital outow of $3.7
billion. In comparison, the net capital outow through portfolio investors
was only $5.78 billion.
Indian banks with overseas operations were under stress much like banks
worldwide were facing stress when the global money market was disrupted.
Collateral requirements for outstanding CDS positions went up. When In-
3The phrase `sudden stop' was brought to prominence by Calvo (1998).
17dian non-nancial rms faced shortages of dollar liquidity in the money mar-
ket outside India, they often turned to Indian banks who lent them dollars
outside India.
Turning to `FDI by India', in the pre-crisis period, many large Indian rms
were in the process of turning themselves into MNCs. This required sending
capital out of the country for the purpose of acquiring companies, setting
up global distribution systems, etc. This process was critically linked to (a)
Optimism about the outlook for the world economy and (b) Benign conditions
for access to equity and debt capital. In the quarter of Oct/Nov/Dec 2007,
$5.8 billion left the country in this fashion.
After December 2007, optimism about the world economy and nancing con-
ditions both turned relatively sombre. Outbound FDI ows declined to $2.9
billion in the quarter of Apr/May/June 2008. Ordinarily, one might expect
that from July to December 2008, conditions worsened in terms of optimism
on the outlook for the world economy and in terms of access to equity or debt
nancing. However, FDI by India rose to $3.2 billion in the Jul/Aug/Sep
2008 quarter and further to $5.9 billion in the Oct/Nov/Dec 2008 quarter.
We would conjecture that these large values were not about Indian companies
buying assets or building a business overseas. They were perhaps about In-
dian companies transferring capital to overseas subsidiaries, which had been
using the global money market, and were now short of dollar liquidity.
Apart from the ocial ows through the permitted mechanism of FDI by
Indian companies, there is a possibility of Indian rms transferring capital
out of the country through transfer pricing with their own subsidiaries. Prior
research has shown that India has substantial capital ows in both directions
through trade misinvoicing. However, it is not possible to identify these ows
in the crisis period of late 2008 using the available data.
3.5 Evidence from the stock market
In the period of crisis, did the rms with treasury operations abroad do worse
than those without? It would be useful to examine how the stock market
sees the share price of Indian MNCs. If a rm got into trouble in its global
money market operations, its share price would do badly.
The most important measure of nancing conditions for Indian rms outside
the country is the Moody's Baa spread. This is the spread between the
Moody's Baa bond and the 10-year US government bond. This measures
the credit risk of bonds that are roughly comparable to those issued by the



























Source: Author's calcucations based on data from Datastream.
best Indian rms. Figure 6 juxtaposes recent values of the TED Spread,
which measures the credit risk of large global nancial rms, with the cost of
borrowing for Baa rms and the Baa spread. The relevent question is: did
the share prices of Indian MNCs get adversely aected with a change in the
Baa spread?
3.5.1 Empirical strategy
The simplest empirical strategy would involve examining how the stock prices
of MNCs uctuated in relation to the changing values of the Moody's Baa
spread. There are three diculties with this approach:
1. Individual stock prices contain substantial idiosyncratic risk. The sig-
nal (of the extent to which Indian MNCs are inuenced by the Moody's
Baa spread) would be weak when compared with the noise (of idiosyn-
cratic stock price uctuations).4
2. It could be argued that MNCs are rms with signicant international
4There is a small literature which argues that in many emerging markets, a substantial
proportion of stock price volatility is explained by the overall market index. However, in
the Indian case, the market model R2 of the CMIE Cospi companies ranges from a median
value of 0.273 in the top decile by size to 0.023 in the bottom decile (Table 4.14 of Shah
et al. (2008)). The extent of idiosyncratic risk in India is hence broadly comparable with
that seen in OECD countries.
19exposure. When business cycle conditions in the world economy worsen,
stock prices of Indian MNCs would do badly. Since the Moody's Baa
spread is correlated with global business cycle conditions, there would
be a bias in favour of nding that the Moody's Baa spread is linked to
the stock price uctuations of Indian MNCs.
3. It could be argued that MNCs tend to be large rms with more leverage.
As a consequence, they are more exposed to credit market conditions.
Indian rms do borrow abroad, though constrained by quantitative
restrictions. All large leveraged Indian rms are likely to have some
borrowing abroad, and would be adversely aected when the Moody's
Baa spread rises. Interpreting this as a consequence of outbound FDI
would be incorrect.
To address these problems, we resort to analysis of a special portfolio con-
structed through a matching procedure. We make two lists of rms: one
of Indian MNCs, and another of exporting rms who are not MNCs. Each
MNC is matched to a partner rm with similar size and leverage. We then
form a portfolio which holds long positions in the MNCs along with holding
short positions in their exporting partners. The performance of the portfolio
shows the ways in which MNCs are dierent from companies in India which
have not embarked on outbound FDI. This empirical strategy addresses the
three problems described above:
1. Idiosyncratic risk: Idiosyncratic risk would be diversied away since
the analysis only involves the returns on portfolios.
2. Exposure to the world economy: MNCs and exporting rms would both
be exposed to the world economy. Hence, mere business cycle consider-
ations would aect both the exporters portfolio and the MNC portfolio.
3. MNCs tend to be large leveraged rms: The matching procedure iden-
ties exporting non-MNC rms which have similar size and leverage
when compared with the MNCs. Credit market conditions onshore
and oshore would inuence both portfolios equally, since both kinds
of rms operate under the identical capital controls onshore.
3.5.2 Matching procedure
For the matching procedure, size is dened as the log((sales + assets)=2).
Variables are standardised, but in the interest of robustness, the sample
median is used instead of the sample mean and the inter-quartile range is
20Figure 7 Distribution of quality of match
















used instead of the sample standard deviation.
Each rm i is a point zi = (z1i;z2i) where z1i is the standardised size and z2i
is the standardised leverage. Let E be the set of exporting, non-MNC rms.






We dene Qi = jjzi   zijj. In order to improve the quality of matching, the
worst 5 per cent of rms in terms of the values of Qi were deleted from the
dataset. This corresponds to deleting the 17 rms with poor matching, leav-
ing a dataset of 315 MNCs and their matched partners. This corresponded
to deletion of rms where Qi > 0:16. Figure 7 shows the kernel density plot
of the best match seen across all the rms. The 25th and 75th percentile of
Qi prove to be 0.02 and 0.06, which suggests that for most rms, excellent
matches were obtained. After deletion of the 5 per cent of rms with poor
matching, the 25th and 75th percentile of Qi works out to 0.021 and 0.056.
Some examples of matching are shown in Table 7. The rms in the left
column are MNCs; they are matched against non-MNC exporting rms in the
right column. As an example, Infosys is matched against Sterlite. Infosys has
a standardised size of 9.71, while Sterlite is at 9.68. Infosys has a standardised
leverage of 1.28 and Sterlite is at 1.41. Thus, Sterlite is a company with size
21Table 7 Examples of matching procedure
Standardised Standardised
Firm Size Lev. Best match Size Lev. Distance
Info-drive Software 3.24 1.16 Intellvisions Software 3.21 1.16 0.0122
Infosys 9.71 1.28 Sterlite 9.68 1.41 0.0752
Infotech Ent. 6.38 1.19 Mahindra L. Devp. 6.37 1.16 0.0171
IPCA Labs 7.10 2.10 Kalyani Steels 7.06 2.20 0.0541
J B Chemicals 6.49 1.61 Jagatjit Inds 6.56 1.56 0.0402
Source: Prowess, CMIE
and leverage much like Infosys. In this case, Qi works out to 0.0752. In the
table, the numerical values seen for distance are small, which is consistent
with the distribution of Qi seen in Figure 7.
Table 8 shows a broad array of summary statistics about the 315 MNCs
where matching was successful, and the partner rms identied.
Some rows merely constitute validation of the matching procedure. Part-
ners were required to be exporting rms with no outbound FDI. Hence, the
OFDI/Assets ratio for partners is 0. Partners were chosen to match the size
and leverage of MNCs. Hence, the median size of the partners, at 6.12, is
similar to the median size of MNCs, at 6.15. Similarly, the median leverage
of the partners, at 1.95 times, is similar to the median leverage of the MCNs,
at 1.91 times.
In other respects, the partners inevitably dier from the MNCs. There is
surprising correspondence in some respects (e.g. number of employees) but
not in others (e.g. sales or turnover ratio). A key fact, which inuences
the estimation strategy of the paper, concerns the export/sales ratio: this
averages to 31.36% for MNCs but only 11.59% for the non-MNC exporters.
3.5.3 Alternative explanations, and estimation strategy
In this fashion, we compute the returns on this portfolio, which is long MNCs
and short a matched portfolio of exporters who are not MNCs. Figure 8
shows the time-series of the value of this portfolio, which is indexed to start
from 100. The time-series of the Moody's Baa spread, St is also shown on
this graph. Both these series are in levels in the graph. The notation H
I=DX
t
denotes the daily returns of the hedged portfolio which is long MNCs and
short non-MNC exporters.
An alternative explanation that limits the interpretation of these results con-
22Table 8 Summary statistics about MNCs and matched partners
Variable Units MNC Partner
Age Years 21.00 25.00
IQR 14.00 29.00
Total assets Rs. crore 581.82 458.45
IQR 1415.24 1272.55
Sales Rs. crore 328.69 437.92
IQR 1004.61 1022.98
Employees Number 790.33 726.00
IQR 2296.71 1862.82
Mkt. Capn. Rs. crore 536.11 352.63
IQR 1850.24 1272.48
Turnover ratio Per cent 92.77 71.35
IQR 151.44 106.73
Exports/Sales Per cent 31.36 11.59
IQR 68.73 28.80
OFDI/Assets Per cent 7.71 0.00
IQR 15.17 0.00
Size Log Rs. crore 6.15 6.12
IQR 2.17 2.20
Leverage Times 1.91 1.95
IQR 1.29 1.27
Number of observations Number 315.00 315.00
Source: Author's calculations based on Prowess, CMIE
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23cerns exposure to global business cycle conditions. While the portfolio that
has been formed is long MNCs and short non-MNC exporters, both of which
should have a trade exposure to the world economy, MNCs are more exposed
to international trade.5 The 315 MNCs where good matches were found have
an average value for the exports/sales ratio of 31.36%. On average, the ex-
porting non-MNC partner had an export/sales ratio of 11.59%. Hence, the
impact of the Moody's Baa spread upon the hedged portfolio could merely
reect the bigger trade exposure of MNCs.
In order to address this concern, we construct a daily time-series which rep-
resents the Indian stock market implications of international trade exposure.
We break the non-MNC exporting rms into two groups: the rms with
an above-median exports/sales ratio and the rms with a below-median ex-
port/sales ratio. The same matching procedure is used to match all above-
median exporting rms with a below-median exporting rm while mimicking
the size and leverage. This gives us the returns series on another hedged
portfolio: long high exports + short low exports. We interpret the returns
series on this portfolio as reecting pure trade exposure to the world econ-
omy, mapped into the Indian stock market returns. We use the notation
H
Xhi=Xlo
t for the daily returns of the hedged portfolio which is long high-
export non-MNCs and short low-export non-MNCs.
The natural estimation strategy is a regression explaining returns on these
long/short portfolios using changes in the Moody's Baa spread. This is done
using a daily time-series that runs from the start of the crisis (June 2007) till
end-Jan 2009, which has 414 observations. To recapitulate notation, H
I=DX
t
is the daily returns of the hedged portfolio which is long MNCs and short
non-MNC exporters; H
Xhi=Xlo
t is the daily returns of the hedged portfolio
which is long high-export non-MNCs and short low-export non-MNCs; St is
the level of the Moody's Baa spread on date t. The simplest model6 is:
5The exports/sales ratio is observed for all rms, so in principle, matching could be done
to nd rms with similar size, leverage and the exports/sales ratio. The diculty with this
path is that for MNCs, sales outside India are tantamount to serving foreign customers by
other means and induce trade exposure to global economic conditions. A fuller denition
of sales to foreign customers (whether through exports or through outbound FDI) is not
measured in the CMIE database.
6When estimating models explaining stock market returns on a portfolio, the overall
stock market index is often useful as an explanatory variable, to reect overall market
uctuations. That is inappropriate here for two reasons. First, the hedged portfolio is
long MNCs and short non-MNC exporters. Both groups of rms have similar leverage and
are spread across all kinds of industries. Hence, the overall exposure of H
Xhi=Xlo
t to the
stock market index should be zero.
Further, the typical market-capitalisation weighted stock market index attaches con-
24H
I=DX
t = a0 + a2(1   L)St + e1t (1)
This model suers from the problem that MNCs have a greater trade ex-
posure to the world economy than non-MNC exporters. As a consequence,
part of what is seen in a2 is just the greater trade exposure of MNCs; ^ a2 can-




t = a0 + a1H
Xhi=Xlo
t + a2(1   L)St + e2t (2)
The coecient a1 would pickup the extent to which H
I=DX
t does well when
global trade conditions improve. If it is the case that MNCs have greater
trade exposure to the world economy when compared with non-MNC ex-
porters with similar size and leverage, then we will observe ^ a1 > 0.
A concern about these models lies in the extent to which shocks to (1  
L)St inuence Indian stock prices immediately. If there are weaknesses in
information processing by the stock market, this information processing could
take many days. To address this, we estimate models of the form:
H
I=DX





bj(1   L)St j + e3t (3)
where lagged values of (1   L)St are allowed to inuence HI=DX at time t.
3.5.4 Results
These results are shown in Table 9. Model 1, corresponding to equation
1, explains returns on the hedged portfolio (long MNC + short non-MNC
exporters) using rst dierences of the Moody's Baa spread. This proves to
siderable importance to MNCs, who tend to be big companies with a bigger weightage
in the index. E.g. a disproportionate number of the big components of the Nifty index
are likely to be multinationals. Hence, the typical market-capitalisation weighted stock
market index is likely to be contaminated with exposure to the very MNCness that we are
trying to identify.
25Table 9 Does the Moody's Baa spread matter in explaining stock market
returns of Indian MNCs?
M1 M2 M1 with lags M2 with lags
(Intercept)  0:02  0:02  0:01  0:01





dBaa.spread  1:50  1:47  1:32  1:31
(0:43) (0:43) (0:46) (0:46)
dBaa.spread lag 1 0:22 0:29
(0:45) (0:45)
dBaa.spread lag 2 0:62 0:65
(0:45) (0:45)
dBaa.spread lag 3  0:11  0:13
(0:46) (0:45)
dBaa.spread lag 4  0:15  0:11
(0:45) (0:45)
dBaa.spread lag 5  0:60  0:63
(0:47) (0:47)
dBaa.spread lag 6 0:18 0:11
(0:46) (0:46)
dBaa.spread lag 7  0:32  0:22
(0:46) (0:45)
dBaa.spread lag 8  0:38  0:48
(0:45) (0:45)
dBaa.spread lag 9  0:17  0:14
(0:48) (0:48)
dBaa.spread lag 10  0:62  0:52
(0:46) (0:46)
N 413 413 403 403
R2 0:03 0:04 0:05 0:06
adj. R2 0:03 0:04 0:02 0:03
Standard errors in parentheses
 indicates signicance at p < 0:05
26be statistically signicant at a 95% level, and economically signicant with a
coecient of -1.5. In other words, a 100 bps rise in the Moody's Baa spread
induces a negative stock market return for Indian MNCs of -1.5 per cent.
The time prole of information disclosure here involves data emanating from
the US about the Baa spread in the Indian night, which is impounded into
Indian stock prices in the day.
Model M2 reects equation 2, augments Model M1 with an additional ex-
planatory variable, H
Xhi=Xlo
t . This measures the Indian stock market impact
of trade exposure to the world economy. This coecient is statistically sig-
nicant and has a value of 0.15. On average, when H
Xhi=Xlo
t is +1 per cent,
the portfolio H
I=DX
t gains 0.15 per cent. This suggests that in the hedged
portfolio H
I=DX
t , the MNCs have more trade exposure to the world economy
than their matched partners with similar size and leverage. At the same
time, after controlling for this, the Moody's Baa spread coecient is essen-
tially unchanged at -1.47. This shows that our main result is robust to the
problem of MNCs having greater trade exposure than non-MNCs.
Two additional specications are shown, which utilise lagged values of the
Moody's Baa spread. These investigate the idea that the Indian stock market
is not fast enough in understanding these things, that the process of domestic
price discovery is not able to understand the implications of last night's
value of the Moody's Baa spread for the valuation of hundreds of Indian
MNCs. This conjecture is not substantiated. Ten days of lagged values
are not signicant, the adjusted R2 actually declines, and the basic results
stand. This suggests that stock market speculators are quite aware of the
implications of uctuations of credit conditions in the US for valuation of
Indian MNCs.
The interpretation of these results is as follows. All rms { MNCs or oth-
erwise { face the same capital controls that inhibit foreign borrowing and
prohibit short-dated foreign borrowing. It is reasonable to think that MNCs
and non-MNCs of similar size and leverage would have the identical incen-
tives to engage in foreign borrowing (within the constraints of the capital
controls). In both cases, capital controls that blocked short-dated borrowing
should have implied that turmoil on the money market in London was not
so important to Indian rms who were supposed to not have money mar-
ket operations. Yet, we nd that Indian MNCs had a credit exposure to
the Moody's Baa spread over and beyond what non-MNC exporters with a
similar size and leverage had. This suggests that there is something about
MNCness which induces a bigger exposure to the Moody's Baa spread.
274 Conclusion
De jure capital controls have not made India as closed to global nancial
markets as expected. The expectation that a global nancial market crisis
would not hit India owing to these controls proved to be incorrect when the
nancial crisis was transmitted to India with unprecedented speed.
In this paper we have explored one element of India's capital account which
answers some of the puzzles about the speed of transmission and behaviour
of domestic nancial markets. With a large presence outside India, Indian
MNCs appear to have escaped the capital controls that are imposed on Indian
companies. As a result, they are exposed to the global money market. Since
they are the large rms, who are signicant players in the Indian economy,
their operations on money markets, foreign exchange markets and India's
balance of payments are large and important. This dimension of India's
integration with global capital markets gives a new insight into India's de
facto capital account convertibility.
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